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Abstract 
For philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend, an outcome of the Plato-
led victory of philosophers over poets is the ‘conquest of abundance’ where 
abstraction replaces the ‘richness of being’. This poignant motif is visible in 
the project of the social sciences, where theory describes classificatory 
schemas that can be imposed upon the social world to categorise and, 
subsequently, explain it. However, Homer’s writings (which predate Plato) 
provide a completely different frame of reference. By reimagining ourselves 
within this work we may be able to rethink and reconfigure our understanding 
of science, and perhaps even the practice of science. This paper reports on a 
Feyerabendian ‘experiment’ in sociology of science which attempts to write 
contemporary scientific production from the frame of reference of Homer. This 
new methodology leads to fragments of epic poetry which act as a 
provocation to, and a disruption of, sociology of science and STS and their 
ways of making sense of science in society.  
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Introduction 
Understanding science – what it is, how it is done, why it is done – is 
an important task for, amongst others, social scientists; their efforts in this 
regard can have significant benefits for society. The importance of scientific 
activity and knowledge is widely recognised, and the importance of public 
understanding of science is widely declared as a significant aim. Science is all 
around us, permeates our lives, thought and cultures, has economic benefits, 
and costs, for us all. But despite this we have an ambivalent and complicated 
relationship to science. Science is highly valued in our society, and the 
production of scientific knowledge in itself is considered to be a good thing. 
But there is also considerable suspicion as to the purposes to which science 
is put, particularly when it encroaches on our lifestyles and moral values. This 
is, in part, a consequence of the stereotypical story that we often tell 
ourselves about science: that it is external and neutral, an institution 
populated by selfless and dispassionate individuals working for a common 
good. We are disappointed when we find out that our stereotypes are 
inaccurate and that science is actually a part of society and is being made by 
individuals who have mundane concerns and connections to the rest of us, 
but also disappointed when we are correct and science acts in aloof and 
remote ways (Erickson 2015; Fuller 2010). On top of this is the sheer amount 
of science: the growth in the quantity of scientific knowledge, in the forms of 
what we are now forced to call ‘outputs’ (at least in UK HE) is striking, but it 
feels as if we are not getting anywhere despite this. Put simply, the more we 
know about science and the more science we have, the less we feel we 
understand it.  
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Why is this? Why do we find it difficult to make sense of science? It is 
not sufficient to simply say that science is complicated and this makes it 
difficult to understand. To be sure, some aspects of formal science require 
participants to have considerable specialist knowledge and skill, and these 
are not available to many people in society. But this does not address the 
fundamental problem which is not one of content (e.g. understanding quantum 
mechanics or molecular microbiology) but of form (what formal science as an 
endeavour, an institution and a form of knowledge actually is). We can see 
this problem of form quite clearly when we observe interactions between 
researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds: even formal scientists, 
say physicists and molecular microbiologists, will not necessarily agree on 
what ‘science’ is, but when we bring social and natural scientists together the 
result is, more often than not, misunderstanding, miscommunication and 
mistrust. In this paper I will attempt to address some of the fundamental roots 
of this problem, and propose a novel methodology, using the philosophy of 
Paul Feyerabend as a starting point, which may free up our thinking about 
science.  
For Feyerabend the roots of our strange and difficult relationship to 
science, even for those inside science, lie in the language, forms of thought 
and theories that we have inherited and that we use to try and make sense of 
the world around us. Feyerabend’s later work, from Against Method until his 
death, contains a number of consistent themes on the history, philosophy and 
practice of formal science (Feyerabend 1978, 1987, 1999, 2011), and many 
commentators provide helpful summaries of this (e.g. Couvalis 1989; Preston 
1997). The posthumous discovery of the MS of Feyerabend’s Philosophy of 
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Nature (Feyerabend [2009] 2016) shows that these themes were extant in his 
1960s and early 1970s works too.  Although Feyerabend’s work has attracted 
a great deal of attention in recent decades, there has been hardly any 
analysis or discussion of his preoccupation with archaic and ancient Greek 
thought (Heit 2016), yet all of his later work is underpinned by an observation 
that he restates again and again. It is that the people of the archaic world, the 
people who lived before the Presocratics, the people who Homer originally 
wrote about and for and who lived before, roughly, 700 BCE, thought about 
and experienced the world differently from later people. This insight is, for 
Feyerabend, crucial in understanding why we think about, practice and value 
science in the way that we do today.  
Feyerabend’s philosophy of science, most clearly articulated in Against 
Method (1978), is not anti-science, but it is anti-dogma. He debunks the idea 
that there is standard scientific method that is deployed in laboratories; 
instead he sees a loose affiliation of pragmatic methods, social practices, 
guesswork, hunches and even fabrications that lead to the production of 
scientific knowledge. This begs the question of why we tell ourselves the 
standard story of science and scientific method as a rational, fixed, superior 
way of understanding the (natural) world? For Feyerabend the reason lies in 
the ‘grammar’ of our thought: we hold a comprehensive view of the world that 
influences our thought, our behaviour and our perceptions (1978, 223). Most 
importantly we have an internalised classificatory scheme, one that is largely 
covert, which creates patterned resistances to alternatives: we simply cannot 
think of other ways of making sense of the world or classifying objects in the 
world because we are locked inside a worldview that circumscribes our 
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conceptual horizons. There are many features of this and many implications. 
The most important one for us as observers and practitioners of formal 
science is this: our worldview tells us that our theories of the world are better 
than our experiences of the world. In our world we have theories that help us 
explain things to us, and concepts that classify things (people, events, 
objects) into discrete categories. This is, of course, fantastically useful: 
without these devices we would be swamped with phenomena and unable to 
form any lines of action. But there are negative sides to this: we simply cannot 
see other possibilities. Feyerabend calls this situation ‘conceptual 
totalitarianism’ (1978, 262); other philosophers have identified something 
similar. 
How long has this been the case? Not for ever, but for much longer 
than a standard history of ideas might suggest. The story that we often tell 
ourselves in Western academia is that the crucial change in how we 
understand came about at the time of the Scientific Revolution in the 
eighteenth century (e.g. Wallerstein 2004, 2006; Foucault 1970; Shapin and 
Schaffer 1985). Feyerabend disputes this; for him the structure of our 
worldview, our privileging of theory over experience, dates back to ancient 
Greek society and, specifically, to the theories of Plato (although Feyerabend 
traces the roots of this in the writings of the Presocratics, as does Karl Popper 
(1945, 1998)).  
For Popper, the start of rational, critical and scientific thought can be 
identified quite clearly in the work of Parmenides. ‘Parmenides’ theory may be 
described as the first hypothetic-deductive theory of the world’ (1998, 17) and 
this marks the start of a tradition which places theory at the heart of rational 
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investigation, privileging theory above observation and experience. The 
rationalist tradition is ‘the only practicable way of expanding our knowledge’ 
(1998, 23), and it does this through conjecture: proposing theories which are 
better than experience or observation as they are a) able to explain more and 
b) can be better tested. (1998, 24). From this we can see a marked rupture 
between Presocratic thought and its predecessors. For Popper, this rupture is 
visible in other ways; for example, Homer has a quite different view of history 
from later writers. “What Homer tries to stress and explain is not the unity of 
history, but rather its lack of unity.” (Popper 1945, 11) In marked contrast, the 
Presocratic Heraclitus emphasised the unity of history and provides a strong 
historicist account.  
Looking into the worldview of those who lived before the Presocratics is 
not easy; by inference we can reconstruct what Parmenides was arguing 
against, through inverting his thought. But this kind of inference drawn from 
negation is neither particularly secure, nor rich. What was the world before 
Parmenides like? For Feyerabend it was a world that was understood very 
differently, and he finds evidence for this in the epic poems of Homer.  
The work of Homer, specifically the Iliad and Odyssey, were composed 
at the same time as geometric art was being made, the period of ancient 
Greek history called the archaic. The Iliad, Homer’s epic 15,693 line poem 
about the Trojan War, in particular, shows people thinking very differently 
about their world and themselves. The Iliad and the Odyssey were used 
through much of the 20th century as evidence of the existence of a people 
(archaic ancient Greeks) who had primitive conceptions of the self, morals 
and ethics and the world. This ‘progressivist’ account of Homer’s audience 
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was expounded most forcefully Bruno Snell (1953) and extended by, notably, 
Adkins (1970, 1972), and largely debunked, equally forcefully, by Bernard 
Williams in his seminal Shame and Necessity (1993). Whilst Feyerabend does 
concur with the progressivists in terms of the evidence that they deploy – for 
example he, too, argues that the archaic Greeks did not have a sense of 
being complete and undivided individuals – Feyerabend is no progressivist for 
he does not argue that this mode of being (what he calls ‘cosmology A’ where 
knowledge of an object is achieved through the enumeration of its parts but 
complete knowledge is never possible) is in any way deficient to what came 
later. Far from it; for Feyerabend (and also for Richard Rorty (1980,44-5)) our 
departure from the worldview of the pre-Presocratics marks a catastrophe in 
terms of the organization of thought, a position quite at odds with either the 
progressivists or, for that matter, Popper. It marks the beginnings of our 
reliance on theory above experience, and of deploying totalising conceptual 
and classificatory schemes that serve to ‘conquer abundance’ (Feyerabend 
1999): Feyerabend calls this way of understanding the world ‘cosmology B’ – 
where true complete knowledge can be achieved (1978, 260-1). There is 
good reason, therefore, for us to reconsider how thought worked in the pre-
Presocratic period as a way, and I would argue the only way available to us, 
of constructing an alternative account of science that allows us to disrupt our 
current thinking. There are very few texts from this period that we can go to 
for inspiration and a place where we can infer how to think in a different way, 
and only one major sourcei; the poems of Homer.  
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Homer 
We know almost nothing about Homer; who he or she was, if Homer 
was an individual or a group of people, when they lived, where they lived, and 
so on. Homer’s life and existence has been subject to a great deal of 
conjecture and myth-making. All that we can know comes from the two 
surviving texts that are credited to ‘Homer’, the Iliad and the Odyssey (and 
even here there is a very long tradition of argument and debate between 
those who think the poems have the same author, and those who don’t; 
Samuel Butler’s The Authoress of the Odyssey (1897) is a classic example). 
These epic poems which were written down in about 700 BCE have been 
subject to critical analysis for more than two and a half millennia, and in that 
period of time a massive body of scholarship has been generated. That such 
a huge amount of writing has been generated, such immense efforts made 
across the centuries to try and understand Homer better, is clear evidence 
that there is something remarkable about Homer’s works. Even today both the 
Iliad and the Odyssey command attention, respect and imitation. New 
translations of Homer appear regularly, and classic translations are still being 
published. Recent bestsellers from Mary Beard (2013) and Adam Nicolson 
(2014) both make a strong case for the continuing relevance of Homer’s 
works.  Homer’s poems have been turned into comic books and graphic 
novels, children’s books and movies: Wolfgang Petersen’s 2004 film Troy, 
starring Brad Pitt as Achilles, Eric Bana as Hector and Orlando Bloom as 
Paris, was the 8th highest grossing film of that year and is currently in the top 
150 highest grossing films of all time, and the Coen Brothers’ 2000 adventure 
comedy O Brother, Where Art Though is loosely based on Homer’s Odyssey. 
In 2015 alone the BBC staged a complete rendition of the Iliad, Simon 
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Armitage’s reinterpretation of Homer, The Odyssey: missing presumed dead, 
went into production, and the National Theatre of Wales’ production of 
Christopher Logue’s interpretation of the Iliad received five star reviews. 
Madeleine Miller’s novel The Song of Achilles retells the story of the Trojan 
War from Patroclus’ viewpoint (Miller 2011) won the Orange Prize for Fiction 
in 2012.  Needless to say, our contemporary interpretations and 
representations of Homer tell us much more about ourselves than they do 
about Homer’s society and culture, but that should not detract from the fact 
that Homer is still an active presence in contemporary society and culture. 
The characters and plot from Homer’s epic poems are embedded in our 
society and culture and have been for a very long time, so embedded that we 
sometimes fail to notice their presence. Think of mentoring: a very common 
practice, but the original mentor was Mentor in the Odyssey, a friend of 
Odysseus and the advisor to his son Telemachusii.  
The Iliad is clearly of the past: it recounts the story of one incident and 
its consequences in the Trojan War, events that took place about three 
millennia ago. It is the first extant account of what the poet thought was 
historical ‘fact’; for the poet the characters and events, the gods and 
goddesses, of the Iliad are quite real and we can assume that the original 
audience would have had the same view. But the Iliad is also of the present in 
that the poem speaks to us in a very meaningful way; it is hard to read the 
poem without finding a connection to one’s own life and, at the very least, the 
poem reminds us of the entrenched position of the tales of the Trojan War in 
our contemporary culture. This is a text that we can have ‘faith’ in; not 
religious faith (although that could be possible if one were so inclined) but a 
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sense that the text is worthy of our attention and can tell us something 
important.  
Homer’s style is remarkable and distinctive, a result of the method of 
composition and the conventions of the day. Homer was illiterate, the Iliad is 
an oral composition and to aid the bard reciting such a lengthy poem from 
memory Homer uses repeated epithets, verses and similes; Achilles is ‘swift-
footed’ even when he is sitting down and eating, for example. But as well as 
these stylistic characteristics there is a feature of Homer’s style that marks a 
sharp contrast to later modes of poetical composition; Homer’s sentence 
construction is ‘a paratactic rather than a syntactic mode of expression, in 
which thoughts, or the elements of sentences, are set out side by side, as it 
were, rather than being built into a kind of pyramid.’ (Kirk 1985, 31) 
Homer’s world is a world of myth, not theory, but it is a coherent and 
sensible worldview. Nature is understood as the expression of supernatural 
beings – gods, goddesses, nymphs and so on – not as conceptualised and 
categorised substance. Whilst this seems irrational to us, it is quite ‘rational’ to 
the people of Homer’s time (Feyerabend 2016, 78). Gods and goddesses, 
expressed in myth, are quite ‘real’ at this time.  
Between these things we can piece together an understanding of a 
society where people thought about and perceived the world in ways very 
different to us. Feyerabend sums this up: ‘[T]he archaic world is much less 
compact than the world that surrounds us, and it is also experienced as being 
less compact.’ (1978, 244). For Feyerabend our difficulties in understanding 
science are a consequence of being part of cosmology B and its conceptual 
totalitarianism. Our world has been compacted, and it is in this form that we 
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encounter it and then experience it, aided and abetted by our concepts and 
theories of the world.  
But perhaps there is something we can do to disrupt this way of 
experiencing and understanding the world; perhaps we can retrieve 
something from cosmology A, something that we could have some element of 
faith in that will put into relief our cosmology B understanding of, in this case, 
science? We revere (and revise) Homer, we know the story of the Trojan War, 
have heard of Hector and Achilles, Odysseus and Priam, Zeus and Hera, 
Paris and Helen. But what if instead of writing about the army ranged across 
the plains and beaches outside the gates of the city of Troy, Homer had 
written about scientists engaged in their work? What would we see from a 
cosmology A perspective on formal science and knowledge production? What 
would the poet see if they found themself in a laboratory?  
 
Homer in the laboratory 
Can we use the differentness of Homer’s way of thinking, seeing, 
experiencing and expressing to help us understand science in contemporary 
society? Two distinct ways suggest themselves. One way is to use the Iliad as 
a metaphor for contemporary science, as a lens through which we can ‘read’ 
formal science; a process of comparison. What do we learn, if anything, by 
comparing the practices of the heroes of the Iliad with those of contemporary 
formal science; what comparisons can we draw between the social structures 
of the Iliad and those of contemporary science? One, perhaps rather obvious, 
parallel is the social structural arrangement of archaic ancient Greek 
communities and the social structural arrangement of the laboratory or similar 
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site of the production of scientific knowledge. The fundamental unit of social 
organization in Homer’s world is the οίκοσ (oikos; household) which has a 
single leader and a large number of support staff arranged hierarchically 
(Finley 1964). The leader is responsible for the security of the household. 
Outside the οίκοσ the world is harsh and insecure; inside there is stability and 
security. The head of the οίκοσ must constantly accumulate wealth in the form 
of possessions: this is not greed but necessity. Each head of an οίκοσ is in 
competition with other heads of οίκοσ for wealth, prestige, prizes. The leaders 
of οίκοσ can and do come together to discuss matters and can even take part 
in joint enterprises such as heading off to attack a city like Troy.  
Translate this into contemporary conditions of how labs operate. There 
is a single leader (usually) who is responsible for the security of the team. 
There is a large number of support staff and these are arranged hierarchically. 
Outside this esoteric scientific community (Fleck 1979; Erickson 2015) the 
world is harsh and hostile – it is a difficult labour market even for highly 
experienced and qualified postdocs – but inside there is stability and security, 
at least until the end of a grant. The head of the team must constantly apply 
for renewed funds; this is not greed but necessity for without these funds the 
team would fold. But accessing funds is through a competitive process, and 
each lab is in competition with other labs, other than when they get together to 
form alliances of varying degrees of permanence. Competition is the order of 
the day, but alliances and joint enterprises can be formed such as when 
applying for large research grants.  
A second obvious parallel concerns the motivations of the heroes of 
the Iliad and the motivations of formal scientists involved in the production of 
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scientific knowledge. The characters in the Iliad are motivated almost entirely 
by their need to acquire honour (Adkins 1972, 15; Williams 1993). They get 
honour through deployment of skill, being good and achieving success. Being 
a good person, being άγᾰθός (agathos), means having excellence ἀρετη 
(arete). This is an all or nothing situation.  Having good intentions counts for 
nothing if one’s action results in failure. The characters who are effective and 
successful (in the context of the Iliad this is measured in terms of fighting) are 
άγᾰθός and ἐσθλος (esthlos). But when failure occurs it is shameful and base: 
αἰσχρός (aischros).  The outcome of success is the accrual of τϊμή (timé): that 
which is paid in token or worth.  
‘Honour is enhanced by the possession and exercise of personal 
qualities that are exceptionally esteemed for their usefulness to their 
possessor and to the community: chief of these are courage and 
strength and military and athletic skills, but also resourcefulness and 
persuasive speech, and, to a lesser extent, physical beauty.’ (Camps 
1980, 7) 
Are these factors at play in contemporary science? Honour and status 
accrue to good experimenters who are successful in achieving results, 
publications and funding outcomes. Shame accrues to failed experiments, 
and there is a certain sense that good intentions are of little import here. I am 
not trying to say that formal scientists are all ruthless and unsupportive of their 
colleagues; far from it. However, it is the case that science is agonistic, it 
proceeds through contestation and argumentation whereby only one person 
or perspective is the winner (Popper 2002). It produces a rigid hierarchy that 
recognises skill and success and punishes failure and lack of success 
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(Erickson 2015). This is all the more the case in contemporary academic 
science where ‘publish or perish’ is the order of the day.  
We could go on (and on): it is, just from these two examples, clear that 
we can read science through a Homeric lens. But this is, in many ways, too 
easy. We could, after all, have chosen any classic text as a lens through 
which to view science – Don Quixote or Gilgamesh for example. Certainly, 
there is something about the Iliad as the first extant written account of ‘fact’ 
that marks it out for special treatment, but simply being able to draw parallels 
is not, in my opinion, sufficient to help us move into a cosmology A frame of 
reference such that we can disrupt and confront our cosmology B mode of 
thinking about science. Indeed, it may even be that we are doing quite the 
opposite. Reading the laboratory through the lens of the Iliad is more a 
process of imposing our current concepts and categories backwards; 
shoehorning Homer into our world. This becomes obvious when we think 
about two themes that this form of reading will not allow to enter: there is no 
room for the Homeric gods in such a reading, and the relentless and bloody 
violence of the Iliad, itself perhaps the most striking feature of the poem, is not 
something we will find in contemporary formal science. By reading the Iliad as 
a metaphor for the production of scientific knowledge we are deliberately 
ignoring what the Iliad is actually about: fate and the awfulness and futility of 
war.  
 
But rather than reading through Homer, using the Iliad as a metaphor 
for contemporary science practice, perhaps we could try something a bit more 
ambitious. Perhaps we could try and imagine what Homer would write about 
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contemporary science practice. If this were possible then we would begin to 
start addressing Feyerabend’s observation that the cosmology B mode of 
thought, instigated by Parmenides and consolidated by Plato (Feyerabend 
2016, 147ff), is too dominating and cannot be escaped from. If Homer were 
here now what would Homer say? And would Homer be exhibiting a mode of 
thinking, understanding and perceiving that came from a time and space that 
was not overrun with the cosmology B worldview? This is where my 
Feyerabendian experiment in sociology of science really starts. Would it be 
possible by immersing oneself in the laboratory and in the Iliad, its language 
and form, its stories and characters, to produce fragments of epic poetry that, 
using a cosmology A perspective, disrupt and unsettle our understanding of 
formal science? Can we produce a Homeric account of a microbiology 
laboratory, its participants, practices and environment?  
 
Method 
This experiment took place in 2015 in a university laboratory that 
specialised in applied microbiology with a particular focus on environmental 
health, water quality and waste water treatment. The action of the Iliad takes 
place over 54 daysiii; accordingly I allocated myself 54 working days to try and 
complete the project. My research method was very simple: I observed and 
participated in all the activities of the laboratory and made notes on these in 
field work diaries. At the same time I read and re-read the Iliad (one book per 
day where possible) and made detailed notes on the text. To supplement this 
I also read as much Homeric scholarship as I could, and again made copious 
notes. All the members of the laboratory were informed about the project and 
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signed consent forms indicating that they were willing for me to observe them 
in their workplace and use the material I collected. To preserve anonymity I 
have assigned all the laboratory personnel names from the Iliad, names that I 
felt were in keeping with at least some aspects of their character and/or 
biography. On day 1 I was given a comprehensive induction to the laboratory 
and its processes by the lead technician in charge of Health and Safety, given 
a locker, a lab coat and a swipe card that provided access to the lab.  
The laboratory was very similar to other microbiology labs I have 
carried out research in: it had standard microbiological equipment (incubators, 
fridges, Bunsen burners, vacuum taps, clean air cupboards, reagents, sinks, 
etc.), and did experiments that many other laboratories carry out. One end of 
the laboratory was partitioned off: this was the ‘dirty’ end where raw sewage 
and other contaminated samples were processed. The other end was 
designated the ‘clean’ end: here the molecular microbiology work, using 
qPCR, was carried out. The workspace at peak times had up to ten people in 
it. The personnel in the lab fell into three categories: PhD students, 
Postdoctoral Researchers, Technicians. Occasionally one of the senior 
academics, who were in charge of the lab and its projects, would visit. In 
general, the lab was a calm, but busy, space.  
One difference to other microbiology laboratories I have worked in was 
the need to collect fresh samples, either from ‘natural’ sites such as water 
courses and rivers or from waste water treatment plants (colloquially called 
‘sewage farms’). These field trips took up a lot of time for members of the 
team, and were a regular occurrence. Other regular occurrences were 
informal group meetings which generally involved shared food or 
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refreshments. The team in the lab spent a lot of time in one another’s 
company both in the lab and outside it. The head of the lab arranged for a 
weekly informal meeting in the coffee bar to share news, gossip and 
information about how projects were proceeding. It was obvious from quite 
early on that the shared culture of the laboratory was important to the 
participants and how they perceived their work.  
Gradually I felt myself being more and more absorbed into the day-to-
day operations of the lab, and I also could feel my immersion in Homer having 
an effect upon me. My ‘exploration’ of Homeric scholarship (I think exploration 
is the best term; I am not nor could I hope to be a classics scholar, but I was 
mapping out and exploring the terrain in a lot of detail) was facilitated by 
advice from Dr Elizabeth Pender, Department of Classics at the University of 
Leeds, and also by deciding to focus on just using a parallel (ancient Greek – 
English) text of the Iliad (Homer, Wyatt and Murray 1999) and trying to 
expand my ancient Greek vocabulary and comprehension.  
And that is how the field work proceeded: I would go to the lab in the 
morning, meet the colleague who I would be shadowing for the day, watch 
what they were doing, sometimes doing some of the experimental work for 
them, or accompany them on a field trip to a waste water treatment plant, and 
I would read in the lab. On non-lab days I would sit in the library and work my 
way through all the Homeric scholarship texts I could find and considered 
relevant. Detailed readings of each book of the Iliad were facilitated by using 
the Cambridge University Press six volume commentary (Kirk 1985, 1990; 
Janko 1992; Edwards 1991; Richardson 1993; Hainsworth 1993). My new 
colleagues in the lab got used to me being there pretty quickly; whilst I did not 
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have a name for my research method or role, they did, calling me the poet or 
artist in residence. I think that is a good description of what I was doing: 
effectively, I was waiting for the Muse to visit me so I could write epic poetry.  
 
Results 
On day 14 I managed to write a simile. This came about while working 
with Diomedes and watching him place his bacteria into the incubator. As he 
shut the door he said ‘they need to eat and grow’. My simile: 
And like the little children that after their lunch need their sweet repose, 
So the bacteria need to eat and grow. 
Idomeneus, a postdoctoral researcher, later told me that he thinks of his 
bacteria as being ‘his babies’, so I felt that I had some corroboration for my 
simile. However, fourteen days into the project and I only had two lines; this 
did not feel like good progress.  
By this time I have, however, worked out which character I am: Nestor 
of Gerenia. He’s a lot older than everyone else in the Iliad, is full of boring and 
rambling stories about the ‘old days’, is a bit narcissistic, is hanging around 
when not really wanted, and is a source of advice for the others – even 
though this advice is frequently either blindingly obvious or wholly inaccurate 
(as with Nestor’s two pieces of advice to Agamemnon in Iliad book 2). 
Younger lab members ask me for advice on what they are doing and as I 
have frequently told them I am a sociologist the only reason for this must be 
my age and position in the university system. With no other ‘authority figure’ 
around and/or available they make do with me. Interestingly, Nestor comes 
from Gerenia (Iliad 2, 336); no-one now knows where this was (Kirk 1985, 
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151). In the laboratory, as a sociologist surrounded by microbiologists, I feel I 
too am from a place no-one knows. 
My field trips become quite regular: Idomeneus and I keep going back 
to the experimental reed bed about 90 minutes drive away. I get used to the 
rhythm of preparing media, collecting samples, processing the samples and 
collecting data. I begin to understand exactly what the experiments are trying 
to achieve. My laboratory colleagues are, I think, beginning to get used to me 
reading out passages from the Iliad and asking them to comment. But I still 
have almost no verses written. I did manage one more verse, on day 34 which 
describes how Thetis collected river water samples from the water course 
next to the waste water treatment site. It was a beautiful setting, with may 
blossom all around. 
Steel-footed1 Thetis2 wades into the river water 
Shaded by the blossoming may tree 
While the black crows3 watch the biofilm 
I annotated the verse, partly as an aide memoire.  
1. Steel-footed because her waders include steel toe caps, and also 
because footwear was a theme for the day. Helen, who was also on 
the trip today, was admonished by Thersites, one of the plant 
workers, for not wearing appropriate safety footwear.  
2. ‘Thetis’ for this person as this is the only female character 
connected to water in the Iliad I can think of at the time. (I later 
changed her name to Elephene, who is human and not divine.)  
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3. The crows were all around the trickle filter / biofilm mechanism, 
sometimes even riding on the rotating arms. They are looking for 
food.  
The themes for day 36 came from the section of the Iliad I read on the 
way to the lab. That morning I was reading Odysseus’ address to the 
assembled army in Iliad book 2 (2.278 ff), and focused on the simile of the 
serpent and the bird. I decided that I would ‘look’ for aspects of Odysseus 
(particularly πολυμήχανος Οδυσσεύς  – Odysseus of the many ways / ever-
ready Odysseus / resourceful Odysseus), and ‘look’ for birds. On this day, 
after another sampling trip to the site I called ‘Petroagros’ to join with our 
colleagues from the University of ‘Euboea’, I sat down again in the lab in my 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), my ‘armour’, to watch Idomeneus carry 
out the first part of the experiment. I put the Iliad on the lab bench and opened 
my notebook, as I always did, and I thought to myself ‘What on earth am I 
going to write now?’ I honestly had no idea: there seemed little point in writing 
down the steps in the membrane filtration procedure yet again; I’d done this 
quite a few times already and I felt that it was unlikely I would record anything 
new. 
But then I started writing, almost unconsciously; words started tumbling out. 
I wrote seven sets of verses that became Membrane Filtration in the Silver 
Tower that afternoon whilst sitting next to Idomeneus as he repeated the 
membrane filtration procedure. The final version below is an amalgamation 
and revision of those seven ‘at bench’ verses. Here it is: 
 
Membrane Filtration in the Silver Tower 
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Down from the peaks of Olympus flashing-eyed Athene darted 
And quickly came to the silver tower of the Achaeans. 
Then she found Cretan Idomeneus of the many ways and spoke to him winged 
words: 
‘Will you now listen to me, knowledge-minded Idomeneus, son of Ioannis? 
Then act now, and swiftly, according to the protocol.’ 
 
And Idomeneus armed himself in gleaming silver. 
He put about his chest the labcoat of his leader, white as snow on the mountain 
peaks, 
With secure fastenings, and fitted it to himself. 
And about his hands he cast the purple gloves of nitrile, 
And then his goggles, clear and sturdy, 
And he took the valiant sharp-beaked pipette that fitted his grasp.  
 
Resourceful Idomeneus assembled the filter units, clear and bronze-coloured and 
six in all,  
Lit the fire of Hephaestus, and arrayed before him on the straight white bench  
The lovingly prepared agar plates.  
 
With flame-scorched forceps Athene-inspired Idomeneus of the many ways pulls 
the membrane filter from its sheath, 
And as the mother sparrow gently places her chicks back in their nest and steps 
back to view her skill  
So dextrous Idomeneus places the membrane filter into the unit 
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Forgetting not his QSR libation to make.  
 
The sharp-beaked pipette pierces the meniscus of the Falcon™, its due amount to 
take, and deliver, 
As a heron dips into the marsh surrounded by the reed bed 
And you, merciless and mighty vacuum, on taps’ turn draw the liquid down 
‘Til dry as skin the sample is. 
 
Then ever-ready Idomeneus with silver tweezers fresh-flamed 
Pulls from the unit the membranes with their bacteria tamed 
By vacuum’s strong pull, like Poseidon’s tides dragging the sailors to their doom 
The air pushed from their lungs while seabirds whirl 
So Idomeneus, high in the silver tower stares through the window and pushes the 
air from under the membrane filters 
Resting on their sustaining beds of wine-coloured agar. 
 
And as a sparrow will return to her nest to feed her chicks so resourceful 
Idomeneus repeats his membrane filtration. 
Just as the wild geese fly here and there, glorying in their strength of wing but 
always taking the same path to their nesting ground, so inventive Idomeneus 
carried out the procedure again and again. 
And as the wily fox knows that the pheasant will return to the covert each night so 
Idomeneus returned to the start of the membrane filtration protocol.  
Just as the herdsman knows the cattle will twice daily want milking so long-
enduring Idomeneus repeated the procedure twice more. 
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And as the falcon swoops over the snake’s lair but catches nothing, only to dive 
again at the same spot when it spies the serpent, so Idomeneus returned to the 
start of the sequence.  
Just as the crafty crows fly down to the media then return to their roosts again and 
again through the long sunny day so much-enduring Idomeneus repeated the 
membrane filtration process nine times in all.  
 
And like the little children who one day will explain the world to us through their 
different knowledge 
But who after their lunch need their sweet repose, so the bacteria need to eat and 
grow. 
Idomeneus, high in the silver tower, stacks the plates and places them in the warm 
embrace of the incubator, 
And he hopes, as the seabirds whirl, and he waits patiently for the colonies of E. 
coli to emerge,  
Ready for counting.  
 
Membrane Filtration in the Silver Tower is one element in a cycle of 
verses I have called An Experimental Cycle. The full structure of the poem is: 
Media Preparation 
The Sampling Campaign 
Membrane Filtration in the Silver Tower 
The Catalogue of the Colonies 
It is about 2,000 words long, roughly 220 lines (a long way short of the Iliad’s 
15,693 lines!). After reading the verses to my colleagues in the laboratory I 
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carried on and wrote a second, shorter cycle: Patroklus (another postdoctoral 
researcher) specifically asked me to write about him and the ‘shit factory’ (his 
term, not mine). Patroklus at the Shit Factory is the first set of verses in the 
Patroklus cycle and is followed by Patroklus in the Silver Tower and Patroklus 
Fights the Fire. In total they amount to some 1100 words and about 135 lines. 
Writing the second cycle was easier because I knew what the method was, 
and also had had some encouragement from my lab colleagues that this was 
worth doing.  
 
These verses, whilst Homeric in form, are not providing a full 
‘cosmology A’ reading of the lab. Why not? Forget the author and their lack of 
poetic prowess for a moment. They cannot achieve this because they are 
embedded in a paradox. Simply stated the paradox is this: the laboratory, the 
formal scientist and formal scientific knowledge only exist because of the shift 
from cosmology A to cosmology B, only exist because of the change in style 
of thought that came about at the time of the Presocratics.  
Despite this problem it may be that the verses bring some sense of 
cosmology A to the scene and, as such, can serve some other purpose. 
Perhaps they can serve as a provocation coming from a shade from the past, 
an irritant that disrupts our usual way of thinking about formal science, 
laboratory work, scientists? To see this we need to interact with the verses, to 
subject them to a form of questioning that places us in a dialogue with them. 
This is a very similar process to how we can read the Iliad.  
The Iliad can be approached in many ways: we can see this just from 
the range of interpretations that are abroad in popular culture. One way, 
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however, is very old; questioning the text about its content and structure, 
asking it ‘why’ questions. This method dates back to Aristarchus of 
Samothrace (c. 220 – c. 143 BCE), was continued in medieval times and is a 
standard method used by Homerists today. The process of questioning the 
text, of considering one’s interpretations of the text in the context of those of 
others, reaps great rewards in studying the Iliad. I am certainly not suggesting 
that the verses presented here deserve the same level of attention or that 
they will reap such rewards, but they can act as a tool to ‘loosen’ our thinking 
about science in a world dominated by scientism: engaging with the verses 
may help us to start to think differently about things. It seems vain to expect 
readers to do this for themselves, to actually sit with the verses, the wider 
descriptions of these and a copy of the Iliad. Rather than asking for that, and 
in the spirit of reflexivity and critical reflection I will provide an example of what 
this close interrogation and interaction with the verses reveals.  
The following is a detailed reading of an excerpt from Patroklus in the 
Silver Tower and it is based on a very famous scene in the Iliad; Hektor 
confronting Patroklus and then killing him (Iliad 16.828 – 867). In my verses 
Patroklus and Automedon are carrying out an experiment which involves 
working with raw sewage and sludge; Hektor is the chief technician in charge 
of health and safety in the lab. The verse appears on the left hand side of the 
page, the commentary pertaining to the laboratory and formal science on the 
right, and the commentary and references to the Iliad appear underneath both 
of these.  
 
Verse Commentary 
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The Achaeans brought forth the 
sludge from the campaign 
The Achaeans are the microbiologists 
working in this laboratory. Together 
with other formal scientists they make 
up ‘the scientific community’. The 
campaign is a sampling campaign, 
but also a protracted struggle, against 
a range of opposing forces, to 
produce scientific knowledge. Like 
the military campaign of Homer’s 
Achaeans, this campaign may suffer 
setbacks and require revision, but it 
will ultimately culminate in a victory of 
sorts. The victory may not be worth 
the effort. 
But more than the foul waters had 
they returned with,  
For the fast flowing and eddying 
currents foamed from the 
vessels and soaked their steel-
toed boots  
And a deep flowing river surrounded 
them.  
Decanting the sludge and raw 
sewage from 50 litre jerrycans into 2 
litre flasks was very, very messy and 
a lot was spilled on the floor. 
This was ‘nature’ being brought into 
the artificial and constructed world of 
the lab, and nature was making itself 
felt very clearly.  
Iliad 
A persistent theme in the Iliad is the danger of hubris. In this situation the 
hubristic attempt to tame nature results in disaster and dishonour. 
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Nature is arbitrary. 
As a man who guides its flow leads 
from a dusky spring a stream of 
water among his plants and 
garden plots, a mattock in his 
hand, and clears away the dams 
from the channel,  
And as it flows all the pebbles 
beneath are swept along, and it 
glides swiftly onwards with 
murmuring sound down a 
sloping place and outstrips 
those who guide it, so Patroklus 
and Automedon sluiced away 
the foul water that surrounded 
them. 
The laboratory is often seen as a site 
of precision and control. There was 
very little precision and control as the 
raw sewage slopped all over our 
boots, the floor, the vessels.  
 
 
We cleared up the spillage using 
buckets and mops (mundane tools to 
us, as mattocks would have been to 
Homer’s audience) and sluiced the 
raw sewage and sludge into the drain 
in the floor.  
 
Italicised section is a quotation from Iliad 21.254-263 
Yet though the flood had abated still 
Hektor approached and rebuked 
Patroklus for his foolishness and 
he spoke winged words: 
‘Patroklus, you said, I imagine, that 
you would ignore our rules, that 
you would achieve victory 
without thought for health and 
Hektor is the head lab technician. The 
lab technicians are Trojans, as 
opposed to the experimenters who 
are Greeks / Achaeans, because 
there is a rivalry and opposition 
between these two groups. Patroklus 
feels that Hektor is trying to prevent 
him achieving his project goals.  
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safety.’ Hektor, quite gently, tells Patroklus off 
for pouring raw sewage all over the 
lab floor. It is clear that Patroklus has 
broken many of the rules of the lab; 
his status and honour are clearly 
impuned.  
c.f. Iliad 16.828: ‘And boasting over him he spoke winged words: ‘Patroklus, 
you said, I imagine, that you would sack our city…’ 
Then did you answer him, Patroklus: 
‘For now Hektor, boast mightily; 
for to you have Zeus, the son of 
Cronos, and Apollo granted 
victory. But we all must know 
that we ourselves will not be 
long in life, and even now does 
death in the form of 
Phenol:Chloroform stand hard 
by us all.’ 
Patroklus argues that sewage on the 
floor of the lab is nowhere near as 
dangerous as some of the chemicals 
that are stored in the lab.  
Phenol:Chloroform, mixed 50:50, is 
used in molecular biology for purifying 
nucleic acids and eliminating 
proteins. Chloroform on its own isn’t 
too harmful; phenol is pretty nasty 
stuff. Mixed together they are very 
toxic and splashes require immediate 
decontamination and, potentially, 
hospital treatment.  
Apostrophization of Patroklus here reflects the way Homer’s Iliad uses this 
trope to indicate that a character is making (or has made) a mistake.  
Italicised section is a close paraphrasing of Iliad 16.844-853 
Loss of honour and status is the worst thing that can happen to a hero in the 
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Iliad.  
But glorious Hektor replied: 
‘Patroklus, why do you prophesy 
sheer destruction for me?  
With skill and Athene’s inspiration we 
will overcome these challenges.’  
So saying he was gone.  
 
Hektor the lab technician reiterated 
that if everyone stuck to the health 
and safety rules and avoided 
contaminating the laboratory space 
then everyone’s projects would be 
successful. Hektor’s calm insistence 
on the need for rules and order in the 
lab is reinforced by his appeals to 
external discourses of science 
practices; in the poem this is 
indicated by the invocation of Athene 
the goddess of wisdom. 
Hektor’s words are calm but deliver a 
stinging rebuke; being a professional 
scientist means knowing how to work 
in the lab in safety and with the safety 
of others in mind. Patroklus has been 
called out on both of these, and in 
public too.  
Italicised section is a quotation from Iliad 16.859-60 
 
I am not arguing here that the poem is a better (or worse!) description 
of what is happening in the laboratory. However, I do think that the poem does 
things which our standard register of social science description and analysis 
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struggles with. Firstly, the identification of power is here done through the 
vehicle of identifying gods and goddesses rather than more conventional 
agents and objects. This is not to obfuscate; it is, rather, to illustrate the 
psychosocial attachments that are occurring here. For example, Patroklus has 
a genuine fear of death in the laboratory, but cannot express this other than in 
this crisis situation, where emotions are heightened. Conventional accounts of 
the production of formal scientific knowledge would not see this or would omit 
it.  Second, the poem juxtaposes the artificial environment of the laboratory 
and ‘nature’, but shows the interaction between these two. In earlier parts of 
the poem we see the laboratory being taken to ‘nature’ and dominating nature 
through extraction of samples, measurement of parameters and definition; 
here we see nature returning to the laboratory and exerting influence inside it. 
Thirdly, we can identify the unexpected tensions and conflicts inside a 
research team: Hektor’s rebuke is successful because of a status inversion 
and through the deliberate deployment of the formal discourse of scientific 
practice and its rules.  
 
Discussion 
Do the verses achieve what they set out to achieve? The idea that 
someone could write about a modern laboratory as if they were Homer is 
contentious; I use the phrase ‘impossible but not pointless’ in describing this 
project to colleagues. However, the elements of the poem and the reading we 
can give of them provides a different mode of description, an alternative view 
that can act as a provocation or irritant to our usual perception of the 
laboratory setting (or any other site of formal knowledge production). It could 
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be argued that this is just a mimetic description; nothing additional is being 
delivered. This may be the case if we consider just the elements of the poem. 
However, taken as a whole, the poem does something beyond merely 
describing the world; it does this in a way that brings in a much wider range of 
elements – humans, materials, discourses, perceptions, hopes, statuses, 
relationships – than a ‘standard’ sociological analysis of the laboratory would. 
But it also does something different than other ‘literary’ methods deployed in 
social studies of science. The New Literary Forms in social studies of science 
of the 1980s and onwards use innovative styles of writing to address the 
‘problem’ of reflexivity and to make the textual work of representation 
apparent to the reader (Yearley 2005 ,101), often using the device of writing in 
dialogue (Woolgar and Ashmore 1988; Ashmore 1989), or using multiple 
voices (Mulkay 1991). These studies are attempts to challenge the unitary 
authorial voice, thus revealing, and revelling in, reflexivity and self-
referentiality. Yet although these textual devices certainly disrupt and confront 
the reader’s relationship to the text, both parties in the dialogue remain 
embedded within the worldview and conceptual scheme of the present thus 
reproducing the shared conceptual scheme albeit in different textual styles. 
The only way we can escape from this, and even then perhaps only partially, 
is to move into the world of Homer. The Homeric strategy allows us to 
reimagine the laboratory in a new conceptual context, one that is not arbitrary 
or fictional; a context that we can have faith in as a basis upon which we can 
make knowledge claims as to what we are seeing in the site of the production 
of scientific knowledge. It is, as we would expect from a Feyerabendian 
methodology, relativist in form, but its content can be realist or constructionist 
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descriptions thus promoting methodological pluralism. It cannot achieve its 
ultimate aim of producing a wholly Homeric account of the lab but it can, 
through our efforts to achieve this, disrupt our thinking not just about the text, 
as the New Literary Forms did, but also our thinking about the very concepts 
we are using in approaching science and science studies. It can also do 
another important thing; change our relationship to the past. We have an 
entrenched understanding of the past, particularly the ancient past, as being 
of use to us only as substrate for historical analysis or moral education. 
Rather than continuing with this we should follow Steve Fuller’s proposal and 
learn to treat denizens of the past as our contemporaries and, in doing so, 
perhaps even reconceptualise our own projects (Fuller 2015, 252). From this 
perspective we can, and indeed must, think about how Homer would make 
sense of the present we inhabit. Were we to do this we would not only 
challenge our current conceptual worldview but also open up possibilities for 
other forms of knowledge long-discarded as ‘myth’ or even ‘madness’ to re-
enter our analyses and converse with on equal terms.  
 
Conclusion 
Our understandings of science and scientific activity are constrained 
and channelled by our received stories of what it comprises, stories that 
articulate theories and concepts that are themselves predicated on a long 
narrative that places theory above experience. These stories are embedded in 
Western thought in the formal sciences and also in the social sciences and 
STS. We need to find some way of breaking through our dominating 
worldview if we are to avoid merely repeating the same stories over and over 
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again. As Feyerabend notes: ‘[t]he transition to the philosophers’ “rational” 
universe … bore problems that are still waiting to be solved today and that 
may be altogether unsolvable; a return to some form of myth may be 
advisable’ (Feyerabend 2016, 4). Looking for Homer in the laboratory may be 
the first step towards this return. If we were to embrace this further, who 
knows what we might see?  
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i An argument could be made to use the works of Hesiod (e.g. Theogony or 
Work and Days (Hesiod and Most 2006)), but these – whilst remarkable in 
their own way – do not have the universal stature and acceptance that 
Homer’s works do. And Hesiod’s unremitting misogyny is wearing.  
ii And even this well-known ‘fact’ is subject to further discussion as the first 
time the name ‘Mentor’ is used is when it is the name given to the slain Trojan 
Imbrius’s father in the Iliad (‘the spearman Imbrius, the son of Mentor rich in 
horses’ 13.171).   
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iii The detailed chronology of the Iliad is the subject of much debate. My 
choice of 54 days is based on the ‘symmetrical’ interpretation of the 
chronology of the poem: 27 days up to Book 10 with the night raid, then 27 
following days up to the burial of Hektor. Interestingly, one of the most recent 
translations of the Iliad, Stephen Mitchell’s 2011 edition, omits the whole of 
book 10, which, apart from anything else, rather disrupts the chronology 
(Homer and Mitchell 2011).  
